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Pavan v. Smith: Equality for Gays 
and Lesbians in Being Married, 
Not Just in Getting Married
Steve Sanders*
Did the United States Supreme Court’s landmark 2015 
marriage equality decision, Obergefell v. Hodges,1 provide only 
a narrow and specific right of same-sex couples to obtain state-
issued marriage licenses and to have their extant marriages 
recognized in a new state?  Or, was the decision intended to go 
further—to vindicate the equality and dignity of gays and lesbians 
at a deeper level—by affirming not only their capacity to enter into 
marital relationships, but also their capacity to fully participate in 
the social institution of marriage as it is regulated by American law 
and understood by contemporary American society?  
The Court answered that question, at least partially, in one 
of its last decisions of the October Term 2016, Pavan v. Smith.2  
Yet the Court may not have been clear and definitive enough in 
Pavan to prevent continued efforts in some states to deny gays and 
lesbians the full meaning of marriage equality. 
I.  Obergefell: “Equal Dignity in the Eyes of the Law”
The movement for marriage equality for gays and lesbians 
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.  My thanks to Daniel 
Conkle, Douglas NeJaime, Aviva Orenstein, and Steven Schwinn for helpful comments and edits, 
and to Sarah Brown for research assistance. 
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017). 
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began, at least embryonically, in the 1970s but did not become a 
subject of national controversy and debate until the mid-1990s.  In 
2004, Massachusetts, as the result of a decision by its state high 
court,3 became the first state to license same-sex marriages.  The 
first decision by a federal court applying the federal Constitution 
to strike down a state anti-gay marriage law came in 2010 in Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger,4 which invalidated California’s Proposition 
8.  Perry emboldened the marriage equality movement, and 
more federal lawsuits were filed around the country.  In 2013 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor5 struck down the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act, which had prohibited federal 
recognition of legal same-sex marriages.  In the wake of Windsor, 
federal courts in a number of states began striking down laws that 
prohibited same-sex marriage.  Windsor was widely perceived as a 
major step toward an inevitable eventual decision by the justices to 
invalidate any remaining state-law gay marriage bans that had not 
already been struck down by lower courts.  That decision would 
come two years later in Obergefell.  
The Obergefell Court anchored its decision in the substantive 
due process right to marry,6 though it said that the right also 
was derived from the Equal Protection Clause.7  “As the State 
itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it 
attaches to it,” the Court said, “exclusion from that status has the 
effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important 
respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them 
out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”8  Marriage 
3 Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
4 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Calif. 2010). 
5 U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
6 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2600-01. 
7 Id. at 2602. 
8 Id. at 2601-02. 
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equality, the Court said, was nothing less than a matter of “equal 
dignity in the eyes of the law.”9 
 
II.  Pavan v. Smith: Obergefell as Applied to Parenthood
A.  State court decision
In recent years, increasing numbers of out, self-identified 
gays and lesbians—often, though not always, in couples—began 
parenting, leading commentators to remark about a “gayby 
boom.”10  This phenomenon has presented challenging new 
issues for family law, because parenthood for gays and lesbians 
often involves not only traditional adoption, but also assisted 
reproductive technologies such as donor insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, or gestational surrogacy.  Because persons in same-
sex relationships “frequently establish parental relationships in the 
absence of gestational or genetic connections to their children,”11 
their legal relationships to their children may be less predictable, as 
“law fails to value parenthood’s social dimensions adequately and 
consistently.”12  As a result, gay men and lesbians who form same-
sex relationships often have found “their parent-child relationships 
discounted” by the law.13  Not surprisingly, scholars have sought 
to understand Obergefell’s implications for parenting by gay and 
lesbian couples.14  
9 Id. at 2608. 
10  See, e.g., lucas gRinDley, gayby boom? CenSuS ShowS RiSe in adoptionS, The Advocate (June 14, 
2011, 10:10 AM), https://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2011/06/14/gayby-boom-found-us-
census-figures.	
11 Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 yale L.J. 2260, 2264 (2017). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2265-66.  
14  See, e.g., id. at 2265 (stating that Obergefell “sought to protect not only romantic bonds, but 
also parent-child relationships, formed by gays and lesbians); Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s 
Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 cHi.-kent l. Rev. 55, 58 (2017) (concluding that 
Obergefell has had a “limited” effect on same-sex parenting cases and that “legislative solutions 
are still needed”).  See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 
77 oHio st. L.J. 919 (2016) (exploring the relationship between constitutional law and family law 
that the Supreme Court’s liberty rulings, including Obergefell, have created). 
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Against this backdrop, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided 
Smith v. Pavan,15 a case brought by three married female couples, 
all of whom had used anonymously donated sperm and artificial 
insemination to bring children into their families.  The couples 
brought suit after the Arkansas Department of Health (“ADH”) 
refused to issue birth certificates to the couples listing both spouses 
as parents.  
The ADH’s action appeared on its face to be a straightforward 
example of discrimination that disadvantaged persons in same-sex 
relationships.  Arkansas law provides that “[f]or the purposes of 
birth registration, the mother is deemed to be the woman who gives 
birth to the child.”16  Arkansas law also incorporates a presumption 
of paternity, specifying that “[i]f the mother was married at the 
time of either conception or birth or between conception and birth 
the name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as 
the father of the child.”17  In other words, the state grants a legal 
presumption in favor of the husband in an opposite-sex marriage 
that he is the child’s legal parent, even without any proof of 
biological paternity.18  
Significantly, the presumption applies even in cases where a 
woman conceives by means of an anonymous sperm donor and the 
husband consents to the procedure.19  In other words, even when a 
member of an opposite-sex marriage plainly has no biological tie 
to the child, Arkansas law treats him as a legal parent by allowing 
his name to be placed on the birth certificate.  Yet, Arkansas did not 
afford the same privilege to spouses in same-sex marriages who 
15 Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169 (Ark. 2016). 
16 aRk. coDe. ann. § 20-18-401(e) (2016). 
17 aRk. coDe. ann. § 20-18-401(f)(1). 
18		The	presumption	may	be	overcome	if	paternity	is	determined	by	court	order	or	by	affidavits	from	
the mother, her husband, and a putative father.  aRk. coDe. ann. § 20-18-401(f)(1)(A)-(B). 
19 aRk. coDe. ann. § 9-10-201(a) (2016). 
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had shared in childbirth decisions and parenting responsibilities but 
lacked biological ties to their children.  
Despite this obvious disparate treatment, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff same-sex couples, and 
did so by attempting to narrow the reach of Obergefell.  First, 
the court observed that “Obergefell did not address Arkansas’s 
statutory framework regarding birth certificates, either expressly 
or impliedly.”20  But this statement, while true in the most literal 
sense, was disingenuous.  Obergefell did not, of course, consider 
the particulars of Arkansas birth certificate law, because the case 
did not involve any plaintiffs from that state.  But the Obergefell 
court did list “birth and death certificates” among the important 
incidents that customarily are attached to marital status.21  And 
in the course of explaining why “[t]here is no difference between 
same- and opposite-sex couples” in their capacities to participate 
in an institution that is at “the center of so many facets of the legal 
and social order,” the Court observed that same-sex couples were 
“denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to 
marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex 
couples would find intolerable in their own lives.”22  Obergefell 
plainly drew connections between the right to marry, and state 
policies which are designed to nurture and protect marriages and 
which privilege marriage over other relationships.  
The Arkansas court attempted to skirt these principles from 
Obergefell by denying that birth certificates are a benefit or 
incident of marriage.  Relying on the fact that the presumption 
of paternity may be overcome by court order or by affidavits 
recognizing a biological father who is not the mother’s husband, 
20 Pavan, 505 S.W.3d at 176. 
21 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2601. 
22 Id. 
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the court maintained that the state’s birth registration scheme 
actually “centers on the relationship of the biological mother and 
the biological father to the child, not on the marital relationship of 
husband and wife.”23  The main purpose of birth certificates, the 
court said, is biological record keeping to facilitate “tracing public-
health trends and providing critical assistance to an individual’s 
identification of personal health issues and genetic conditions.”24  
Thus, the court said, it is important that “the mother and father on 
the birth certificate … be biologically related to the child.”25  The 
court insisted that “marriage, parental rights, and vital records” 
must be considered “distinct categories” of legal analysis.26  
The state court’s majority opinion never squarely confronted 
the question of how these points could be reconciled with 
the presumption in Arkansas law—rebuttable, but still a 
presumption—that a husband should be listed on the birth 
certificate as the parent of any child born into a marriage.27  Nor 
did it explain why a supposedly biology-based birth registration 
scheme that was concerned with “public health trends” and 
“genetic conditions” would afford this presumption even where 
it is known that a donor’s sperm, not the husband’s, was used to 
conceive the child.28  
The Arkansas court also considered whether “naming the 
nonbiological spouse on the birth certificate of the child is an 
23 Pavan, 505 S.W.3d at 178.  
24 Id. at 181. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 180. 
27 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
28  At some point in the state appellate litigation, the Alaska Registrar of Vital Records changed its 
interpretation	of	state	law	and	conceded	that	children	born	of	artificial	insemination	to	a	married	
couple should have both spouses listed as parents, regardless of whether they were same or 
opposite sex.  Pavan, 505 S.W.3d at 187 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  This 
development arguably could have mooted the case as to two of the three plaintiff couples (the 
third couple was not yet married at the time their child was born).  But the state supreme court’s 
majority opinion did not discuss this development, nor did the U.S. Supreme Court’s per curiam 
opinion. 
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interest of the person so fundamental that the State must accord the 
interest its respect,” and concluded that it was not.29  But that was 
not the proper question.  Despite the court’s effort to make Pavan 
a case about a parent’s rights in relationship to children rather than 
the right to be treated equally in marriage, the proper question was 
why Arkansas law should give disparate treatment to same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples in a context—recognition of legal parentage 
for children who are born into a marriage with the help of assisted 
reproduction—where they are otherwise similarly situated.  A 
dissent by Justice Paul E. Danielson stated the matter plainly and 
candidly:
 Arkansas [law] provides that the name of the “husband” 
of the mother shall be entered on a birth certificate as 
the father of the child, without regard to any biological 
relationship and on the sole basis of his marriage to the 
mother—specifically, if he is married to the mother at the 
time of either conception or birth or between conception 
and birth.  The obvious reason for this is to legitimate 
children whenever possible, even when biological ties do 
not exist.  Thus, there can be no reasonable dispute that the 
inclusion of a parent’s name on a child’s birth certificate 
is a benefit associated with and flowing from marriage. 
Obergefell requires that this benefit be accorded to same-
sex spouses and opposite-sex spouses with equal force.30
B.  U.S. Supreme Court Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court essentially agreed with Justice 
Danielson’s framing of the issue.  A majority of the Court (with 
29 Pavan, 505 S.W.3d at 180. 
30 Id. at 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
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three justices dissenting) apparently saw the question as an 
easy one, summarily reversing the Arkansas Supreme Court in 
a relatively short per curiam opinion without oral argument or 
additional briefing beyond the written arguments presented in the 
petition and opposition to certiorari. 
After recounting the background of the case and the Arkansas 
rules governing birth certificates, the Court held that “Obergefell 
proscribes” the “disparate treatment” that had been given to the 
plaintiffs.31  In Arkansas, the Court said, birth certificates are “more 
than a mere marker of biological relationships,” because “[t]he 
State uses those certificates to give married parents a form of legal 
recognition that is not available to unmarried parents.”32  Thus, 
“[h]aving made that choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with 
Obergefell, deny married same-sex couples that recognition.”33  
The Court noted that birth certificates often are “used for important 
transactions like making medical decisions for a child or enrolling 
a child in school.”34
When Obergefell declared that “a State may not ‘exclude 
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and 
conditions as opposite-sex couples,’” the Court intended, it said 
in Pavan, that those “terms and conditions” refer not merely to the 
requirements for a marriage license, but to the “‘rights, benefits 
and responsibilities’” that accompany marital status.35  The Court 
observed that Obergefell had “expressly identified ‘birth and death 
certificates’” among these rights and benefits, and noted that 
“[s]everal of the plaintiffs in Obergefell challenged a State’s 
refusal to recognize their same-sex spouses on their children’s birth 
31 Pavan, 137 S.Ct. at 2078. 
32 Id. at 2078-79.  
33 Id. at 2079. 
34 Id. at 2078.  
35 Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2605, 2601). 
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certificates.”36  
Indeed, the Court could have added that the decision’s 
namesake, James Obergefell, did not file his federal lawsuit 
seeking a right to get married.  Rather, his objective was to have 
his home state of Ohio recognize his marriage to his terminally 
ill husband John, which had been performed in Maryland, so that 
James could be listed as the legal spouse on John’s Ohio death 
certificate.37  Being listed on a death certificate—whose primary 
purpose is the record the date and cause of someone’s death—
probably is not very high on anyone’s list of the important rights 
and benefits of marriage.  Yet James Obergefell’s quest for simple 
equal treatment on this matter took him from being an unknown 
Cincinnati real estate agent to someone whose name will forever 
be linked to a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision for gay and 
lesbian rights. 
The Court’s per curiam opinion drew a dissent from summary 
disposition by newly seated Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by 
justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.  Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent argued that the Court’s summary treatment of the matter 
was inappropriate because, in his view, it was unclear why 
Obergefell should necessarily be offended by “a birth registration 
regime based on biology.”38  As explained above, however, this is 
not really an accurate or even honest description of the Arkansas 
birth certificate scheme, in which, for married heterosexual 
couples, biological fact is subordinated to the presumption of 
paternity.39 
36 Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2601). 
37 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2594-95. 
38 Pavan, 137 S.Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
39 See supra notes 17-19, 30 and accompanying text. 
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III.  Discussion
Although opposite-sex marriage had always been assumed in 
all states, no state expressly defined marriage as a union between 
a man and a woman until Maryland did so in 1973 “in an apparent 
response to attempts by same-sex couples to obtain marriage 
licenses.”40  The bans on same-sex marriage enacted by a majority 
of the states from the 1970s to 2012 did not arise from a careful, 
well-informed, deliberative process in each state in which the pros 
and cons of marriage equality were fairly and carefully considered.  
Rather, these express bans were the products of political backlash 
against an emerging movement for LGBT rights generally and 
marriage equality specifically.41  Most of the bans were hastily 
enacted by legislatures or through ballot measures in response 
to political campaigns by social and religious conservatives who 
argued that gays and lesbians presented a threat to the institution of 
marriage and to the very idea of the family itself.  
This historical and social context may help to explain why the 
Court in Obergefell did not merely decide that the Constitution 
protects a right of gays and lesbians to marry.  The Court framed 
its decision in the language of “equal dignity.”42  It noted that in 
the courts (perhaps as opposed, implicitly, to the political process), 
the question of marriage equality could be considered “without 
scornful or disparaging commentary.”43  And so while its subject 
40  Kevin Rector, Md. Attorney General Says Supreme Court Must Overturn Same-Sex Marriage Bans 
Nationwide, tHe baltimoRe sun (Mar. 9, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/features/
gay-in-maryland/gay-matters/bs-gm-attorney-general-issues-report-calling-samesex-marriage-
bans-20150309-story.html. 
41  For treatments of this history, see Steve Sanders, Making It Up: Lessons for Equal Protection 
Doctrine from the Use and Abuse of Hypothesized Purposes in the Marriage Equality Litigation, 
68 Hastings l.J. 657, 674-683 (2017) (arguing that the history, context, and effects of the marriage 
bans yield considerable evidence from which animus could be inferred); micHael J. klaRman, 
fRom tHe closet to tHe altaR: couRts, backlasH, anD tHe stRuggle foR same-sex maRRiage 
(2013). 
42 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2608. 
43 Id. at 2597. 
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was the right to marry, Obergefell also represented something 
larger.  Against the backdrop of several decades of political abuse 
and backlash against claims for gay and lesbian rights, the Court 
was bringing this group into full and equal citizenship under the 
Constitution. 
The Obergefell opinion reflected a broad understanding of 
contemporary American marriage as “a keystone of our social 
order”44 and an institution that “safeguards children and families 
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, 
procreation, and education.”45  Indeed, the Court observed that 
“many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to 
their children, whether biological or adopted.”46 Denying their 
parents equal marriage rights, the Court said, inflicted on the 
children of same-sex couples “harm,” “humiliat[ion],” and “a 
more difficult and uncertain family life.”47  Among the “profound” 
advantages of legal marriage is that it “allows children ‘to 
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their community and in their daily 
lives.’”48
One cannot separate the Court’s discussion of the right of gays 
and lesbians to marry from its discussion of the legally conferred 
benefits and responsibilities of marriage.  The Court explained that 
it was time to decide the question of marriage equality because 
“slower, case-by-case determination of the required availability 
of specific public benefits to same-sex couples . . . would deny 
gays and lesbians many rights and responsibilities intertwined 
44 Id. at 2601. 
45 Id. at 2600 (emphasis added).  
46 Id. at 2600. 
47 Id. at 2600-01.  
48 Id. at 2600 (quoting Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2694–95). 
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with marriage.”49  Unsurprisingly, the Court listed birth certificates 
among the familiar incidents of marriage; most Americans 
understand that marriage typically affects whose names are listed 
on a newborn’s birth record.   
To be sure, much of the reasoning in Obergefell is opaque, 
and understanding its full meaning may require the reader to draw 
some inferences or read between the lines.50  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, the author of Obergefell, is famous in his substantive due 
process and equal protection jurisprudence for painting in broad, 
bold, and often blurry strokes; he is not famous for precise legal 
formalism.  This has led to criticisms of the Obergefell opinion, 
even among those who agreed with the result.  For example, 
Professor Andrew Koppelman, a longtime advocate for marriage 
equality, has criticized the opinion’s “remarkably weak reasoning” 
and “leaps of logic.”51  
Still, it is difficult to see how a jurist could read Obergefell 
and conclude that Justice Kennedy or the other members of the 
majority intended to allow Arkansas or any other state to subject 
same-sex couples to legal regimes in which marriage and parenting 
are treated as separate and distinct undertakings.  To be sure, 
many children are raised by parents who are not married, and law 
regulates many issues in the parent-child relationship in ways that 
are independent of marriage.  But an honest reading of Obergefell 
makes clear that the Court was addressing the dignity of gay and 
lesbian couples in being married as well as getting married, and 
49 Id. at 2606. 
50  One commentator has suggested that Obergefell “left unresolved important ambiguities” and 
that “future interpreters” will need to look to “nontextual tools, such as adjudicative context, 
contemporary reception, and subsequent applications.”  Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: 
Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents, 94 n.c. l. Rev. 379, 389 (2016). 
51  Andrew Koppelman, The Supreme Court Made the Right Call on Marriage Equality — but They 
Did It the Wrong Way, salon (June 29, 2015, 11:15 AM),  http://www.salon.com/2015/06/29/
the_supreme_court_made_the_right_call_on_marriage_equality_%E2%80%94_but_they_did_it_
the_wrong_way/. 
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being married often includes raising children.  
The members of the Arkansas Supreme Court are not the 
only jurists who have wrestled with the meaning and scope of 
Obergefell.  A similar birth certificate case involving lesbian 
couples in Indiana who had used artificial insemination remains 
pending, as of this writing, in the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals.52  In Kansas, a federal district court rejected that state’s 
arguments that Obergefell should be read narrowly and should 
not apply to parental rights:53  “Obergefell requires every state to 
treat same-sex married couples the same way it treats opposite-sex 
married couples,” the court said, and “[t]his includes the marital 
benefits of raising children together, with the same certainty and 
stability given opposite-sex couples.”54  Another federal district 
court in Mississippi preliminarily enjoined a pre-Obergefell state 
law that functionally prohibited adoptions by married same-sex 
couples.  While the district court acknowledged that Obergefell’s 
“approach could cause confusion,”55 it nonetheless read the 
decision as “extend[ing]  its holding to marriage-related benefits—
which includes the right to adopt.”56 The district court noted that 
“the majority opinion foreclosed litigation over laws interfering 
with the right to marry” as well as “rights and responsibilities 
intertwined with marriage.”57  And in a post-Pavan decision, the 
Arizona Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Obergefell 
should be read narrowly as governing only the right to marry, 
and it invalidated a parentage presumption that applied to males 
in opposite-sex marriages but not to the female spouse of a birth 
52	Henderson	v.	Adams,	No.	17-01141	(7th	Cir.	filed	Jan.	23,	2017).	
53 Marie v. Mosier, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1218-1219 (D. Kan. 2016). 
54 Id. at 1219. 
55  Campaign for S. Equal. vs. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs., 175 F. Supp. 3d 691, 709 (S.D. Miss. 
2016). 
56 Id. at 710. 
57 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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mother who had used an anonymous sperm donor.58 
It is perhaps understandable that some lower courts have 
commented about the difficulty of divining Obergefell’s full 
meaning.  The Supreme Court did not include a sentence like 
the following:  “Aside from holding that marriage licenses and 
recognition must be made available on equal terms, we further 
hold that persons in all marriages, whether same-sex or opposite-
sex, must be treated equally and must receive the same rights, 
benefits, incidents, presumptions, and responsibilities—including 
those associated with the parent-child relationship—that the federal 
government, the states, or their agencies and political subdivisions 
have chosen to provide by law.”  One might have hoped that 
the Court in Pavan would have realized its error and taken the 
opportunity to preclude further litigation on similar matters by 
including some clear and unequivocal language such as I have 
suggested.  But it did not.  (Perhaps this small-bore approach was 
necessary to keep the vote of Chief Justice John Roberts, who had 
dissented in Obergefell but did not join the dissenters in Pavan.)  
Aside from rejecting Arkansas’s “disparate treatment” of birth 
certificates, the Court did not clarify or add doctrinal coherence to 
the equal protection principles that Obergefell invoked, along with 
substantive due process, as a basis for its decision.  Consequently, 
Pavan did not erect a firm or clear barrier to new and imaginative 
schemes in other states intended to treat gays and lesbians as 
second-class citizens.  
Take, for example, Texas.  Four days after the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued Pavan, the Texas Supreme Court, in an interlocutory 
appeal, allowed a case to go forward in which two private citizens 
plan to argue to a Texas trial court that, Obergefell notwithstanding, 
58 McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 496 (Ariz. 2017). 
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the City of Houston may deny same-sex couples the benefits 
it provides to opposite-sex couples.59  According to the Texas 
justices, this argument was not precluded because the Supreme 
Court in Obergefell “did not address and resolve” the question of 
“whether and the extent to which the Constitution requires states 
or cities to provide tax-funded benefits to same-sex couples.”60 
Obergefell, they argued, held only that “the Constitution requires 
states to license and recognize same-sex marriages to the same 
extent that they license and recognize opposite-sex marriages, but 
it did not hold that states must provide the same publicly funded 
benefits to all married persons.”61  Incredibly, the Texas court said 
its analysis was not affected by Pavan, remarking that “neither 
Obergefell nor Pavan provides the final word on the tangential 
questions Obergefell’s holdings raise but Obergefell itself did not 
address.”62
Such an underreading of Obergefell is wrong both doctrinally 
and morally.  To maintain that the decision was only about 
the right to obtain a marriage license, and not about the right 
to fully participate on equal terms in the status of marriage as 
contemporary American law and society understand it, requires an 
almost deliberate obtuseness.63 
It should be noted that the citizen plaintiffs in Pidgeon have no 
serious constitutional or public policy theory about why disparate 
treatment between gay and straight married couples should be 
59 Pidgeon v. Turner, No. 15-0688, 2017 WL 2829350 (Tex. June 30, 2017). 
60 Id. at *10. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at *12 n.21. 
63  Or perhaps the Texas court, which had originally declined to hear the case, simply caved under 
pressure	from	Texas	Republican	elected	officials.		See Doyin Oyeniyi, Here’s What You Need To 
Know About Pidgeon v. Turner, texas montHly, (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.texasmonthly.com/
the-daily-post/heres-need-know-pidgeon-v-turner/ (noting that “pressure” on the court to hear the 
case “reached its peak when Governor Greg Abbott, Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick, and Texas 
Attorney	General	Ken	Paxton	filed	an	amicus	brief	urging	the	court	to	reopen	the	case”).	
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permissible after Obergefell.  They simply oppose the idea of 
“taxpayer-funded benefits to same-sex couples”64 and resent the 
idea that federal courts can tell a Texas city how to behave.  Their 
lawyer has said he would like to use the case as a vehicle for 
eventually asking the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn Obergefell.65 
One difference between the Arkansas and Texas cases is that 
the Arkansas birth registration scheme at issue in Pavan predated 
Obergefell.  It was not enacted with the intent to disadvantage 
families headed by gay men and lesbians.  Arkansas family 
law statutes, like those in many states, still contain gendered 
language—words like “husband” and “wife”—and have not been 
updated to reflect the post-Obergefell reality of legal same-sex 
marriage.  This made it perhaps understandable that the state health 
department might question whether it had the authority to issue 
birth certificates to same-sex couples on the same terms under 
which they were issued to heterosexual couples.  By contrast, 
in Pidgeon, the resistance apparently is driven by anti-marriage 
equality backlash, mixed with traditional Southern resentment of 
the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Of course, the sensible thing for all states to do would be 
to update their marriage and parentage laws to conform to the 
contemporary realities of same-sex marriage and families.  But 
change comes hard to states like Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, 
Mississippi, and Texas, which resisted marriage equality at the 
ballot box and in the courts.  And so for the foreseeable future we 
are likely to see, at best, a passive-aggressive neglect of important 
family law questions in America’s red states by the conservative 
Republicans who control the governments in those states.  These 
64 Pidgeon, 2017 WL 2829350, at *5. 
65 Oyeniyi, supra note 63. 
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elected officials will feel no particular incentive to modernize their 
codes, and same-sex couples may need to continue engaging in 
costly and wasteful litigation to fully vindicate the “equal dignity” 
they were promised in Obergefell.  
